Browsing Posts published on August 27, 2008
Back in April 17, 2002, DoD executives established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as part of the changes brought about by the Unified Command Plan. NORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense and also serves as head of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a U.S.-Canada command. Last week I heard NORTHCOM’s Commander — General Victor Renaut’s address at the Atlantic Council meeting. In his remarks and in the questions that followed he addressed the threat of cyber attacks.
The most important point of his remarks came when he stated the United States must move in “anticipation of the threat” rather than reacting to cyber attacks as we are today. Secondly, he acknowledged how difficult it is to determine whether an attack on a nation’s cyber infrastructure is an act of war. He went on to say: “We have not yet defined what that (referring an act of cyber war) is and he noted “That’s a policy decision that has to be made.”
This clearly articulated the need to develop a “Cyber Warfare Doctrine” that is used beyond the United States and agreed upon by the United Nations and NATO. Earlier this year I authored such a doctrine and was able to publish a redacted summary version in issue #56 of International Intelligence Magazine. An extended summary with sensitive security information can be viewed here.
As efforts continue to pull together all the pieces of President Bush’s classified cyber security program, (now estimated at $30 billion) the greatest challenges may be the multi-nation approach and the fact that the U.S. government and the high tech industry have to work together to address this growing threat. The tenets for cyber warfare must be developed and integrated into a flexible framework for decision making about this new method of warfare that military leaders have called the most significant threat of the 21st century.
For decades its name could not be spoken outside of a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility or mentioned to someone without at least TS/SCI clearance.
It built wondrous satellites that did things like detecting missile launches from space that no one had believed possible until the National Reconnaissance Office did them.
But a string of failures, goofs and budget busters, combined with the increasing importance of intelligence gathered by air breathing assets such as Predator and Global Hawk drones, has led a prestigious commission of space experts to recommend that the NRO be merged with Space and Missile Systems Command to create something called the National Security Space Organization.
The recommendation is made by something called the Allard Commission, which was created by Congress last year. It is led by the national security space guru Tom Young, a former Lockheed Martine executive and the man who always seems to get the call to figure out how to fix space when things go wrong. Young has kept his panels recommendations under wraps but word began leaking out last week.
The plan would also lead to stripping the Air Force of its executive agent for space the person who serves the Office of Secretary of Defense as the lead on unclassified space acquisitions and transferring it to the new authority. This office will also have budget authority for all space programs.
This would include a combination of the NRO and SMC and other elements of Air Force Space Command to create a single National Security Space Command.
A veteran space intelligence expert, Bob Butterworth, rejected the Allard Commissions proposals, especially its efforts to integrate so-called black (NRO) and white (military) space. The effort to integrate is just misconceived, he said. People who even started out doing black-white integration mostly gave up after going through the first space based radar experience. Space Radar was an idea generated from the top of the Donald Rumsfeld Pentagon. It was supposed to provide the US with both moving target indication the ability to track trucks and tanks and highly refined strategic radar imagery of use to the intelligence community. The idea has foundered on the rocks of wildly differing requirements and enormous cost.
Integration exponents also argue that the space industrial base is largely shared between the two communities. Thus, integrating programs could save money and lessen the strain on the limited pool of engineers and other specialists needed to build satellites and their sensors.
That has not been documented. It is just hand waving as far as I can tell, Butterworth said.
For those watch these things closely, the Allard Commissions use of the NSSO name has caused considerable confusion in the rumor mill. Was the commission recommending dissolution of the NSSO, an office without budgetary authority that advises the Pentagons executive agent for space? No. It was suggesting creation of an entirely new organization.
Part of the NROs problem is that under current law no one really knows including congressional aides who help write the laws deciding this who is in charge of classified acquisition programs. This raises the question, who is in charge, and that is unanswerable, said a congressional aide. For background on some of this, see last weeks story on the BASIC program.
Does this mean the NRO will vanish? The name may change, the organization may be rebuilt but the functions wont disappear. More on this tomorrow.
It is found that anything that can go wrong at sea generally does go wrong sooner or later, so it is not to be wondered that owners prefer the safe to the scientific. It is also found that it is almost as bad to have too many parts as too few; that arrangements which are for exceptional and occasional use are rarely available when wanted, and have the disadvantage of requiring additional care. Their very presence, too, seems in effect to indispose the engineer to attend to essentials. Sufficient stress can hardly be laid on the advantages of simplicity. The human factor cannot be safely neglected in planning machinery. If attention is to be obtained, the engine must be such that the engineer will be disposed to attend to it.”
In the November 13, 1877 session, published 1878, Alfred Holt, “Review of the Progress of Steam Shipping during the last Quarter of a Century,” pp. 2-11, here p. 8, Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Vol. LI, Session 1877-78–Part I. London: Published by the Institution, 1878. (source)
There are a number of lessons from the limited information we have heard regarding the Russian Black Sea Fleet involvement in Georgia, and we don’t believe it is too early to begin talking about them.
I have already read in multiple places how shocked, SHOCKED I tell you!… people are that the tiny Georgian Navy could possibly not only conduct a successful attack, but perhaps even damage the Russian cruiser Moskva in a Black Sea battle a few weeks ago. We have no hard evidence, only the reports that we have linked from the blog, but if we are simply speaking to the possibility the answer is of coarse “yes it could happen.” Those with doubt fail to conceal their utmost faith in technology, a terrible failing if there ever was one in the littorals. Most of all though, they simply fail to recognize the most important element of littoral warfare: tactics. You see, the quote above is best known as one of the earliest precursors to the modern version of Murphy’s law. As it turns out, Murphy was a nautical man, and understood littoral warfare.
Those who seek comfort in technology to override all possibilities fail to realize that tactics is the ultimate equalizer. Technology is not a substitute for tactics. Considering the probability of a nighttime amphibious landing, with multiple small vessels traveling in the littoral, and the potential of private civilian craft also operating at night; a maritime force can and apparently did exploit the conditions for an attack. With limited visibility, the Russians were forced to rely on technology to identify friend from foe in the fog of war, a process that is never easy. This is not limited to the Russians, and is an important reminder that while technology can improve the situational awareness of naval forces, tactics and doctrine determine success or failure in littoral warfare regardless of the size of your opponent. Victory at sea is earned by those who take victory from their opponent.
But the battle was not the most important lesson from the recent conflict in the Black Sea. The most important lesson is that Russia was able to take objectives because their naval forces were expeditionary. While control of the sea is a worthy task, we are yet to see a major power, regional or superpower, struggle to take command of the sea from an opponent who contested it. The utilization of naval power for Russia was decisive, in fact Russia has achieved extraordinary goals not because Russia was able to attack by land south into South Ossetia, but because they were able to move large numbers of troops by sea to seize strategic objectives. Lets be honest, Poti is an enormous strategic holding by Russia, it isn’t surprising they aren’t giving it up now that they have achieved control.
For all the talk about how the United States hasn’t conducted an amphibious landing against a hostile enemy, we note it has been even longer since a US submarine has sunk an enemy vessel in anger… yet no one is suggesting we get rid of submarines. Amphibious assault is a core military requirement of naval forces as old as sea power itself, and as Georgia reminds us, in the expeditionary era it is the ability to leverage expeditionary forces that will give nations the advantage over their adversaries.
The lesson at sea of the recent Russian-Georgian conflict is that our strategists have been right all along, it is about turning towards the littorals to extend influence beyond the shores, and we must perfect the skills, hone our tactics, and resource properly to empower our people to be prepared and successful in the littorals where Murphy’s law tends to show its ugly face.
[From Observing Early Lessons from the Russia-Georgian Conflict]
The Federation of American Scientists security blog has an interesting article up regarding PLA activity to limit the effectiveness of Google Earth. I guess they aren’t very happy.
Chinese military authorities are paying increased attention to foreign satellite reconnaissance of Chinese forces and operations, and are pursuing countermeasures such as camouflage and deception to conceal sensitive material and activities, according to a newly-disclosed analysis (pdf) performed in 2007 by the DNI Open Source Center.
We enjoy looking at PLAN submarines, but if building underground submarine bases is how the PLAN is coping with Google Earth and other open source satellite imagery, what a great bargain for the United States. You’ll have to forgive me if I take a moment and laugh at the insecurity of China in a Google world.
If China wasn’t the only economic power in the top 30 hiding their military expenditures, nobody would care. However, the lack of transparency is a problem, in fact the lack of transparency is about the only hurdle facing the US and China in forming genuine partnerships in the 21st century. Secrets on top of secrets hidden behind secrets is not a healthy foundation for partnership.
The report is a quick read of seven pages. Guess we can look forward to a future where electronic jamming and laser dazzling are techniques China uses to conceal the activity of the PLA from the curious eyes of satellite technology. Welcome to the emerging information war.
DriveCrypt is an “Ideal to encrypt USB-disks/sticks, secondary disks /partitions, CDs, DVDs, cont…
[From DriveCrypt Security Model Bypass and Incorrect BIOS API Usage ]
